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JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-3-4(4) (Supp. 1989) provides
that appeals from final orders of the district court come under
SS 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.

Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) jurisdiction based

on transfer from the Supreme Court depends initially on whether
the case was properly before the Utah Supreme Court.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether a judge acts within his discretion in setting aside

an extraordinary writ when 1) the writ is based on a petition
that misstates or omits facts, 2) the writ seeks to order an
agency to act in an area over which the agency has discretion to
act, 3) the petitioners seeking the writ have not exhausted their
administrative remedies, and 4) the district court lacked
jurisdiction to issue the writ.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6 (1989);
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1989);
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 (1989);
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17 (1989);
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Johnson-Bowles, Inc. and Marlen V. Johnson are registered
with the Utah Securities Division as Broker-Dealer and Agent,
respectively.

In January 1989, Johnson-Bowles sold-short shares

1

in a company called U.S.A. Medical, Inc.

The price of the U.S.A.

Medical stock thereafter rose dramatically in the over-thecounter market.

Johnson-Bowles, rather than pay the increased

price to cover its short sales, began a campaign with securities
regulators to convince these agencies to investigate for
fraudulent practices in the trading of U.S.A. Medical stock.
Failing that, Johnson-Bowles filed for injunctive relief in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah and was
granted a temporary restraining order.

On March 1, 1989, Judge

J. Thomas Greene found that the stock had been traded illegally
as part of a fraudulent scheme and in violation of federal and
state registration provisions, but refused to relieve JohnsonBowles of its obligations under its brokerage sales contracts.
On March 1, 1989, the Utah Division of Securities ("the
Securities Division"), armed with a copy of Judge Green's
findings, and in order to protect Utah residents from unlawful
distributions and fraud, issued an order suspending the
availability of all exemptions under the Utah Uniform Securities
Act for the offer or sale of U.S.A. Medical stock.

That same

day, a copy of the Division's Order was hand-delivered to
Johnson-Bowles.
By suspending sales, the Securities Division intended to
halt manipulation and fraud in the sale of that stock in Utah.
As a consequence of the March 1, 1989 Order, the price of U.S.A.
Medical stock dropped dramatically.

During the time that the

Division's order was in place, Johnson-Bowles offered to purchase

-2-

and did purchcise U.S.A. Medical stock from Utah citizens at the
lower price in an attempt to cover its stock delivery obligations
and extricate itself from a financial predicament.
On April 27, 1989, upon discovery of the purchases, the
Securities Division filed administrative proceedings against
Johnson-Bowles and its principal, Marlen Johnson (appellants
hereafter referred to collectively as "Johnson-Bowles").

The

Securities Division sought to revoke or suspend their respective
registrations.

Among other charges, the Division alleged that

Johnson-Bowles had engaged in "dishonest or unethical practices"
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6(1) (g) because the
actions of Johnson-Bowles "in soliciting and/or purchasing the
USA medical shares during the pendency of the Division's Order,
encouraged or otherwise aided in the violation of Section 61-1-7
of the Act."2

Both Johnson and Johnson-Bowles were licensees of the Division.
Johnson-Bowles also seeks to raise a plethora of substantive
arguments in this appeal. One of these arguments is lack of
subject matter jurisdiction or federal securities preemption
under National Associtation of Securities Dealers rules. These
arguments were addressed before the Securities Division, (R. 123125), and all can be addressed on review of the Division's final
order. Nevertheless, the Securities Division has jurisdiction
over the state licenses it grants to dealers. There is no
question that Johnson-Bowles is subject to the Securities
Division's jurisdiction. Section 61-1-6(1)(g) gives the Division
jurisdiction to suspend or revoke a license for dishonest or
unethical practices.
2
Section 7 of the Securites Act reads: "It is unlawful for any
person to offer or sell any security in this state unless it is
registered under this chapter or the security or transaction is
exempted under Section 61-1-14."

-3-

Johnson-Bowles moved to dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

The Administrative Law Judge

(hereafter, "ALJ") held that Johnson-Bowles' conduct circumvented
the Division's efforts to prevent trading and denied JohnsonBowles' motion to dismiss the dishonest and unethical practices
claim.

Johnson-Bowles requested that the ALJ certify his

decision as a "final order" of the Division.

The ALJ stated:

"It is not within the province of this Court to decide whether
the order set forth below is 'final', as to allow for subsequent
judicial review, nor to certify any such order as being final for
purposes of such review."

(R. 16).

On September 11, subsequent to the ALJ's denial of the
motion to dismiss and before the ALJ had made findings of fact,
conclusions of law or a recommendation to the Division with
respect to license revocation, Johnson-Bowles filed under Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 a Recjuest for Agency Review of the denial
of its motion to dismiss.

(R. 8-11).

On September 26, 1989, the Securities Division filed its
"Brief in Reply to Respondents Request for Agency Review and
Hearing." (R. 120-134).

The brief stated that agency review of

the matter was discretionary and review of the interlocutory
order was not the appropriate subject of review under the
Administrative Procedures Act.
On October 6, 1989, Johnson-Bowles also filed an additional
reply brief in support of its Request for Review.
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(R. 78-88).

On October 27, Johnson-Bowles filed its Petition in the
Third District Court for an Ex Parte Extraordinary Writ.

In its

petition, Johnson-Bowles declared, "Since September 11, 1989, the
date Petitioners filed their Requests for Agency Review or for
Certification, Petitioners have heard nothing from either
Respondent Baldwin or the Securities Advisory Board Member
Respondents.

Petitioners believe and allege that respondent

Baldwin is deliberately or negligently stalling the disposition
of Petitioners Request for Agency Review. . . ." (R. 4).
Johnson-Bowies' Petition failed to point out that on
September 26th the Division had filed a response to the Request
for Review.

Additionally, it failed to indicate that the Rules

of the Department of Commerce allow the Division 20 days after
the last responsive pleading before the Division need issue an
3
Order on Review.
It failed to point out in the body of the
4
Petition

that the last responsive pleading was filed by Johnson-

Bowles on October 6, 1989.

It further failed to note that under

an appropriate calculation of the timing of the issuance of the
Order in Review, the Division need not have issued a response
until October 27th, the very day upon which Johnson-Bowles
3
Rule R151-46b-12D of the Department reads as follows: "A
written order on review shall issue within 20 days after the
filing of any response or, if applicable, the submission of the
matter after oral argument."
4
The body of the Petition mentions the existence of JohnsonBowies' reply brief without referring to the date of its filing:
"Subsequently, Petitioners further filed a Reply Brief to their
Request for Agency Review, a true and correct copy of which is
attached hereto. . . . " (R. 4) The actual date of the filing of
the Reply Brief would only be apparent to the Judge had he
examined the copy of the brief attached to Johnson-Bowles'
petition.
-5-

applied to the District Court for its Extraordinary Writ.
Nevertheless, on October 27, 1989, Judge Sawaya granted
Johnson-Bowles' Rule 65B(e) ex parte request for an Extraordinary
Writ and Order.

(R. 91-92).

On October 30, 1989, the Division issued its Order on Agency
Review, denying the Request for Review and refusing to certify
the ALJ's order as final. Also on October 30, 1989, the Division
received notice of Judge Sawaya's October 27th Extraordinary
Writ.
On November 1, 1989, the Division filed an Ex Parte Petition
5
under Rule 7(b)(2) to set aside the District Court's ex parte
order.

(R. 105-112).

The Division's Petition argued that

Johnson-Bowles had "hoodwinked" the judge into granting
extraordinary relief by failing to disclose the matters cited in
the preceding paragraphs. Additionally, the Division pointed out
that review under the Department's rules of purely
"interlocutory" orders would be inappropriate, and that the
Division had in its October 30th Order refused to review the
order of the ALJ because of its interlocutory nature.

The

Division attached a copy of that October 30th Order to its
petition.
Judge Sawaya granted the Division's request to set aside the
previous order on November 1, 1989.

(R. 103-04).

Thereafter,

Johnson-Bowles then asked Judge Sawaya to reinstate his writ of

Rule 7(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
part, "Except as otherwise specifically provided by these rules,
any order made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated
or modified without notice by the judge who made it. . . ."

-6-

October 27. (R. 144-45).

The request was denied.

This appeal is

based on Judge Sawaya's denial of Johnson-Bowles' request to
reinstate.
On August 13, 1990, following a full hearing before the
Securities Advisory Board, the Securities Division issued its
final order suspending the registration of Johnson and JohnsonBowles for one year.

(See Appendix A ) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Whether Johnson-Bowies' appeal should be granted depends on
whether it was an abuse of discretion for the lower court to set
aside an extraordinary writ of mandamus.

This discretion vested

in the lower court certainly includes the perogative to withdraw
a writ when the initiating petition has clearly misled the court.
Johnson-Bowles, in its petition for an extraordinary writ,
by means of omitting to clearly state the relevant facts, law,
and applicable rules, convinced the court below that the Division
was not taking action on Johnson-Bowies' request for agency
review.

In fact, the Division had responded to Johnson-Bowles

Request for Review, and Johnson-Bowles had replied to the
response.

There was nothing in the ordinary course of these

pleadings to justify a writ in equity.
Even assuming that Johnson-Bowles was entitled to agency
review of the ALJ's order, Johnson-Bowles requested mandamus from
the district court before the issuance of the Order on Review was
required under Department Rules.
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As a general principle, a court should not assume equity
jurisdiction when administrative remedies are in progress.

In

the present case, administrative proceedings were in progress
when Johnson-Bowles filed its petition for mandamus.

Further,

mandamus should not issue where the administrative body has
discretion to act.

The Director of the Securities Division has

discretion to reviewing or not review interlocutory
recommendations by administrative law judges.
The Securities Division has discretion in determining
whether to give agency review to Johnson-Bowies' claims.

Section

12 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act dictates the
procedure for agency review.

While the language of Utah Code

Ann. § 63-46b-12 allows a party to "seek review of an order by
the agency," this does not mean that all orders are immediately
reviewable under that section.

"Order" in the section means

"final order" by the agency head or one authorized to make such
an order.

Under the Utah Uniform Securities Act, only the

Director of the Division, with the consent of the Advisory Board,
may enter an order affecting the status of one of its
registrants.

The ALJ makes only recommended findings and

recommended orders to the Division.

These do not become orders

of the Division unless they are adopted under Utah Code Ann.
S 61-1-6.
Furthermore, the ALJ's denial of a motion to dismiss is also
not an "order" as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12. A
party wishing to dismiss a suspension/revocation proceeding has
no right of immediate interlocutory appeal for administrative

-8-

review to the agency.

If all litigants had an unfettered right

to interlocutory appeals, then parties could cripple the
administrative process by appealing at every stage of the
proceedings.
This case is not properly before the court because there is
no "order" to which the party can request review.

The ALJ's

denial of the motion to dismiss was subject only to discretionary
review by the Division because the ALJ had not submitted a final
recommendation.

Because this was a formal adjudicative

proceeding, initial judicial review of the interlocutory
proceeding, if available at all, would have only been proper
before the Court of Appeals,

And, even though jurisdiction

might have been proper in the Court of Appeals, there are valid
policy reasons for leaving review of ALJ interlocutory
recommendations to the discretion of the agency head.
The question of whether this court should order the lower
court to reinstate the Extraordinary Writ is now moot owing to
the Division's entry of its final order on August 13, 1990.
Finally, Rule 33 damages are appropriate.

The issues

Johnson-Bowles sought to raise below were not ripe for review.
The entry of the Extraordinary Writ was predicated upon erroneous
information provided by Johnson-Bowles ex parte.

When the court

below was adequately apprised of the true facts, law and
governing rules, the court appropriately set aside its order and
rightly refused to reinstate.

The appeal is frivolous because it

lacks any substantive foundation in fact or law and the issue it
deals with, whether this court should order the lower court to

-9-

reinstate its order is entirely moot at this point in these
proceedings.

ARGUMENT
I. A Judge Has Discretion in Determining Whether a Writ of
Mandamus Should Issue, and Writs of Mandamus Do Not Issue Where
the Government Entity has Discretion to Act
A.

Standard of Review

A judge has discretion to grant or deny extraordinary writs
of mandamus, and the decision will be sustained unless there is
an abuse of that discretion.

Garcia v. South Tucson, 135 Ariz.

604, 663 P.2d 596, 598 (Ct. App. 1983); Cain v. Dept. of Health,
582 P.2d 332, 334 (Mont. 1978).

Therefore, this Court should

uphold Judge Sawaya's decision not to reinstate the extraordinary
writ unless this Court finds such action is an abuse of
discretion.
B. The District Court Lacked Equity Jurisdiction Because
Johnson-Bowles Had Not Exhausted its Administrative Remedies
As its name indicates, an extraordinary writ does not issue
in ordinary circumstances.

Mandamus, therefore, should not issue

before the exhaustion of administrative remedies, in the ordinary
course of administrative proceedings.
617 P.2d 331, 332 n.l (Utah 1980).

Levie v. Sevier County,

A party cannot expect a trial

court to exercise equity jurisdiction when that party has failed
to pursue adequate and available administrative remedies. All
Purpose Vending, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 561 A.2d 1309, 1311 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989).

Additionally, a writ cannot be used as an

alternative way to appeal administrative decisions. Merrihew v.
Salt Lake County Planning, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983).
-10-

In Merrihew v. Salt Lake County, the Planning Commission
revoked Merrihewrs building permit.
revocation.

Merrihew did not appeal the

Instead he asked the District Court for an

extraordinary writ to require the Planning Commission to
reinstate his permit.

On appeal the Utah Supreme Court

reaffirmed its position that parties must exhaust administrative
remedies as a prerequisite to seeking judicial review.

J^i. This

approach is consistent with the basic principles underlying the
writ of mandamus, namely:

"[It] is not for the courts to intrude

into or interfere with the functions or the policies of other
departments of government."

Wright Development v. City of

Wellsville, 608 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1980).
Johnson-Bowles sought reversal of the ALJ's denial of
Johnson-Bowles' motion to dismiss.

It filed a Request for Agency

Review under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 and Department Rule R15146b-12.

The record demonstrates that while this review process

was still under way, Johnson-Bowles sought recourse in state
court by asking the court to issue an extraordinary writ to
compel the Securities Board or Securities Director to take action
on the motion to dismiss.

The Record is clear that the last

responsive pleading filed in the matter was Johnson-Bowies'
Reply, submitted to the Division, October 6, 1990.

Even assuming

the Securities Division was obligated to review the decision,
which obligation was contested in the Division's responsive
brief, under Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-12D., the Securities
Division had until October 27, 1989 to issue its written order.
See supra note 3.
-11-

However, that was precisely the day that Johnson-Bowles, not
willing to wait for the Division's decision, and without notice
to the Division, convinced the lower court to issue its writ.
Therefore, the Petition for the Extraordinary Writ was an attempt
to circumvent the exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement and judicial review by going to the courts for a writ
of mandamus.
Johnson-Bowles relies heavily on Alcoa v. ICC, 761 F.2d 746
(D.C. Cir. 1985), to support its claim that the proper remedy is
a writ of mandamus to the administrative agency.

In Alcoa, an

administrative law judge with the ICC dismissed a shipper's
complaint.

Railroad companies appealed the commission's adoption

of the ALJ decision.

The Interstate Commerce Act required that

the ICC make a final decision on the appeal within 180 days.
Alcoa is inapposite to the issues raised in this appeal.
First, in Alcoa the ICC fully dismissed the case.
disposition of the proceedings is final action.

A summary

Here, by denying

the motion to dismiss, the ALJ continued the proceedings.
Second, in Alcoa, a statutory 180-day period was running.
748.

Id. at

And, by statute, the ALJ's decision in that case became the

decision of the ICC when the ICC did not complete its review
within the 180-day period.

In this case, the ALJ's order at best

was of an interlocutory nature, not disposing of the action.
Therefore, Appellants' reliance on the Alcoa case is misplaced.

12-

C. An Extraordinary Writ Should Not Issue to Force a State
Agency to Take an Action or Make a Decision that is in Its
Discretion
1. Mandamus should not direct performance of
discretionary duties
Mandamus should not issue against government agencies to
force them to make decisions or to take actions which are within
their discretion.

Rule 65B(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure provides for the issuance of an extraordinary writ
where an officer, exercising judicial functions abuses the
discretion of that function.
mandamus does not lie.

If an act is discretionary,

Ingram-Clevenger, Inc. v. Lewis & Clark

County, 636 P.2d 1372, 1374 (Mont. 1981).

Mandamus should not

issue to compel a public official with discretion to act in a
certain way.

Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960,

967 (Utah 1986).

Only when a public official has exceeded the

boundaries of the discretion may a writ of mandamus be granted.
Id.

In this case, Appellants did not show at any stage of the

proceedings leading to this appeal that the Director had exceeded
the boundaries of his discretion, nor could they because, again,
the time for the Division to issue its order on review had not
run.
2. The Securities Division has the Discretion to
Review the Interlocutory Decisions of Its
Administrative Law Judges
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-l, et seq. (1989) (hereafter,"UAPA") provides two levels of
appeal from an ALJ's decision. Administrative review is through
§§ 12 and 13, and judicial review comes via § 14. Judicial
review under S 14 is not at issue here, as § 14 deals with review

13-

by a state court of a final agency action.

Though the pleadings

in the court below are packed with arguments on the merits of
Johnson-Bowies' arguments to dismiss, as is its Appellant's
Brief, Judge Sawaya was asked to issue a writ, not to review the
agency's decision.

Sections 12 and 13 do not apply here either

because both contemplate final agency action.

a. Section 12 of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act Only Provides for Review of
"Final," not "Interlocutory" Orders.
Sections 12 and 13 of the UAPA provide for two mutually
exclusive means of review at the agency level.

Section 12,

agency review, governs review of a final order to a higher level
within the agency.

Section 13, reconsideration, governs review

of a final order when there is no higher level within the agency
to review the decision.
Section 12 of the UAPA provides a procedure for agency
review of a final adjudicative proceeding.

However, it is clear

that the review is conditional:
If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any
adjudicative proceeding to seek review of an order by the
agency . . . the aggrieved party may file a written request
for review. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(l)(a) (1989).

The Department of

Business Regulation has promulgated rules consistent with section
12 which allow a request for agency review.

However, the term

"order" in this context, does not include an order of the type
issued by the ALJ in this case.

Though the ALJ employed the term

"order" in his ruling, the ruling amounts to a refusal to
recommend to the agency head a dismissal of the charges. No
14

action of the agency is an order of the agency without adoption
by the Director and the Securities Advisory Board under Utah Code
Ann. S 61-1-6.7
A logical construction of the language of the Department's
Rules compels this conclusion as well.

Utah Admin. Code R151-

46b-12B, provides that "the effective date of the previously
issued order shall be suspended until ten days after the order on
review has been mailed to all parties."

This language

contemplates only orders which have some effect upon their entry
or have an "effective date," i.e., final orders, because the
language makes no sense if applied to the type of interlocutory
order that is the subject of this dispute.

The rule only

contemplates orders that have an affirmative "effect" that may be
suspended during the course of review and for 10 days thereafter.
The final order of the Division entered on August 13, 1990
contained an effective date.

The ALJ's order denying the motion

to dismiss did not have an effective date; it merely endorses the
status quo and allows the action to go forward, not recommending
dismissal of the count in question.

Furthermore, it would make

little sense to suspend the effectiveness of an order denying a
The decision of an agency is not final where the decision
maker does not have the power to issue a final decision. This is
so even where it appears to be the order of the agency.
Ledbetter v. Alcohol Beverage Laws Enforcement, 764 P.2d 172, 182
(Okla. 1988).
In Ledbetter, the Director of Alcoholic Beverage
Enforcement had only the power to recommend the imposition of
fines to the Commission, yet the Director of Alcoholic Beverages'
order was titled "Order of the Commission." The Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that even though the Commission apparently acquiesced,
the Director had no statutory authority to impose fines.
Similarly, in the present case, the ALJ only has power to
recommend to the Board and Division Director a proposed course of
action. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6(1) (1989).
15-

motion.

Therefore, the ALJ's order was not an order of the type

contemplated by Rule R151-46b-12. And if it is not contemplated
by the agency's rule, then Section 12 of the Administrative
Procedures Act does not apply by its own terms.
Section 12 says that where the statute or rule permits,
agency review is available to the entity that the statute or rule
designates for that purpose.

Section 61-1-6(1) vests power to

suspend or revoke a dealer's license with the director and a
majority of the Securities Division.
a final decision.

An ALJ has no power to make

An "order" of the ALJ, therefore, is not an

"order" of the agency.

It is a recommendation.

The Director or

the Securities Advisory Board may choose to adopt or to reject
o

the recommendation of the ALJ.

Because the administrative law

judge acts in an advisory capacity, orders to dismiss or to deny
dismissal are not binding upon the Division, not subject to
review.
b. For Policy Reasons, Mandatory Interlocutory
Review is Undesirable
Johnson-Bowles claims "[i]t makes no difference what kind of
order is involved in a Request for Agency Review."

(Brief 17).

It is precisely that view that would lead to the type of

In Capital General Corporation v. Dept. of Business Regulation,
777 P.2d 494 (Ut. Ct. App.), cert, denied, 781 P.2d 878 (Utah
1989) this Court reviewed a case in which this "recommending"
posture of the ALJ was most evident. In Capital General, the
ALJ, after a hearing on the merits, recommended that the Division
deny the staff's petition. The matter went to a further
evidentiary hearing on the merits before the Securities Advisory
Board and the Board rejected the ALJ's position, adopting their
own findings and order which were upheld on appeal. Jd. at 496.
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frivolous interlocutory litigation evident in this appeal, if
all orders, and not just final orders, were reviewable, then
parties could cripple the administrative process by requesting a
review of every ALJ decision.
The major policy reason behind prohibiting all orders from
being appealable is administrative economy.

In denying the

Request for Agency Review of the matter, Securities Division
Director John Baldwin stated,
Review of interlocutory matters would necessarily deprive
agency adjudicative proceedings of the simplicity and speed
contemplated by the Administrative Procedures Act and the
rules governing adjudicative proceedings in this Department,
and would inappropriately interpose an interlocutory appeal
process within the Department.
(R. 116).
Other jurisdictions have made similar pronouncements:
The agency head should be accorded even wider discretion in
determining when to review an order on an interlocutory
basis. His powers of review are related to his regulatory
authority, an executive function, and, consequently, are
more expansive and flexible than those of an appellate
judge. The agency has the sole authority to decide each
case in order to effectuate regulatory policy. The decision
is not that of the ALJ, but of the agency head.
In Re Uniform Administrative Procedure Rules, 90 N.J. 85, 447
A.2d 151, 159 (1982).

III.

Johnson-Bowlesr Appeal is Moot
On August 13, 1990, the Securities Division issued its final

order suspending the registration of Johnson and Johnson-Bowles
for one year.

Johnson-Bowies' appeal from Judge Sawaya's order

setting aside of the writ of mandamus is now moot.

Even if this

Court reinstates the writ of mandamus, the Securities Division
has already reviewed and approved the findings, conclusions and
-17-

order that was the product of a full hearing before the
Securities Advisory Board.

Many of the same issues that

Appellants argue in their brief were argued before the Advisory
Board at hearing.

Appellants may argue the same matters in

administrative and judicial review of the August 13, 1990 order.
Therefore the question of whether this court should command the
lower court to reinstate its writ is now moot.

There is no

current harm that threatens Appellants if that order is not
reinstated.

In fact, reinstatement at this point will likely

lead to duplication of appeals, wasting the resources of both
parties.

III.

The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction
The District Court lacked statutory jurisdiction to issue

the extraordinary writ requested by the petition.

Utah Code Ann.

Section 78-2a-3 provides in part:
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process
necessary . . . (b) In aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) The final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals
from the District Court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of agencies, . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1989). (Emphasis added).
Because the administrative proceeding below was a formal
adjudicative proceeding, the District Court lacked proper
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ.

(R. 156-57).

Furthermore, § 17 of the UAPA provides:
(l)(a) In either the review of informal adjudicative
proceedings by the district court or the review of formal
-18-

adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court
may award damages or compensation only to the extent
expressly authorized by statute•
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as
required by law;

....

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-17 (1989). (Emphasis added).
While the above provisions contemplate "review" of agency
proceedings, they clearly indicate a legislative intent to assign
jurisdiction over extraordinary writs and interlocutory appeals
of formal administrative proceedings to the Court of Appeals, not
the District Court.

Therefore, since the appellate function and

all matters dealing with the review of administrative proceedings
have been assigned by statute to the Court of Appeals for
disposition, it is safe to assume that original equity
jurisdiction to issue necessary writs to administrative agencies
now rests exclusively with the Court of Appeals.
IV.

Johnson-Bowies' Appeal is Frivolous
Finally, the Securities Division is entitled to Rule 33

damages.

Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Practice

provides for damages, specifically, attorney fees in opposing a
frivolous appeal.

Rule 33 damages are appropriate because

Johnson-Bowles has brought this appeal solely to harass and
perpetuate litigation.

There is no justiciable issue presented

to this court by the appeal.
A frivolous appeal is "one in which no justiciable question
has been presented and appeal is readily recognizable as devoid
of merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever
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succeed."

Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990).

Further, Rule 33(b) states:
For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact,
not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose
such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of
litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party
filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
Utah Rule App. P. 33(b) (1990).
Johnson-Bowies' appeal serves no legal purpose.
no justiciable issues before this Court.

There are

All issues have been

resolved or can be resolved through the proper channels of
appeal.

That the appeal is frivolous is apparent in the

observation that the standard on review is abuse of discretion.
See Fife v. Fife, 777 P.2d 513, 514 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (where a
judge's decision is obviously not clearly erroneous Rule 33
damages are appropriate).
It has always been the position of Appellees that the chief
cause of the issuance of the lower court's writ was JohnsonBowles' blatant failure to inform the lower court of the ongoing
nature of the proceedings, that its application for the
extraordinary writ was acutely premature, and the relevant
statutes, and agency rules would not support use of an
extraordinary equitable remedy to address wrongs that were purely
the matter of invention on the part of Johnson-Bowles.

Continued

pursuit of this appeal serves no practical purpose other than to
satiate Appellant's desire to "teach the agency a lesson" by
forcing the expenditure of sparse resources in pointless
litigation.
-20-

CONCLUSION
Johnson and Johnson-Bowles have yet to articulate the remedy
they seek in this appeal.

However, close examination of the

record of the proceedings below must lead this court to the
conclusion that the appeal lacks merit.

The court below was on

absolute sure-footing in its order setting aside the writ and in
its refusal to reinstate.

Pursuing the matter through this

appeal is a step that should not have been taken and it is the
type of wrong for which the Appellees are entitled to fees under
Rule 33.

Other issues raised by Appellants concerning the propriety
of the ALJ's denial of the motion to dismiss have either already
been resolved or can be resolved through appropriate
administrative or judicial review of the August 13, 1990 order of
the Division.

The Securities Division has considered Johnson-

Bowies' arguments and addressed them in its Order on Agency
Review and its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
Johnson-Bowles can raise its substantive arguments in appellate
review proceedings.

For the foregoing reasons, this appeal

should be dismissed with attorneys fees granted under Rule 33 in
favor of appellees.
DATED THIS

of August, 1990.
R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General

M
Mark' J'. G i # f f i n
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
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PROOF OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(b) the
undersigned hereby certifies that on the zJl-—' day of August,
1990, four (4) copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES were
hand-delivered to Attorneys for Appellants John Michael Coombs
and Craig F. McCullough at 72 East 400 South, Suite 220 Salt Lake
City, Utah

84111 and eight (8) copies, one of which contained an

original signature, were filed with the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals•
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Johnson - Bowles Company
Plaintiff - Appellant
VS
John C. Baldwin
Defendant - Appellee

Clerkfs Certificate
District Court No. 890906506
Appellate Court No.. 90021^-CA

I, clerk of the above entitled court, do hereby certify that
the hereto attached file contains all the original papers as
requested by the designation on file herein, filed in the court in
the above entitled case, including the Notice of Appeal which was
filed on the

14th day of March, 1990

I further

certify that the above described documents constitute the Judgment
Roll and that the same is a true and correct transcript fo the
record as it appears in my office.
I further certify that an Undertaking on Appeal in due form
has been properly filed and that the same was filed on the
14th day of March, 1990.
I further certify that said Judgment Roll is this date
transmitted to the Appellate Court of the State of Utah, pursuant
to such appeal.
Witness my hand and the seal of said court at Salt Lake City,
Utah, this

12th day of

June

1990CRAIG E. LUDWIG
CLERK OF THE COURT
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72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC.. a
Utah corporation and MARLEN V.
JOHNSON.

PETITION FOR EX PARTE
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT

Petitioners.

JOHN C. BALDWIN. Director.
Securities Division of the
Department of Commerce. State
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER.
KENT BURGON, DAVID HARDY.
MARGARET WICKENS. and KEITH
CANNON, members of the Securities
Advisory Board overseeing the
Securities Division.

CASE NO.

0

^^oh^oboY

JUDGE J « S. S « &

Respondents

Petitioners Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., and Marlen V. Johnson, by and
through their counsel and pursuant to Rule 65B(a)(2),(3), and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, hereby petition the above Court for an Ex Parte Extraordinary Writ. Based on
Rule 65(B)(e), the Writ may be granted without notice and in this case there is no reason why
it should not be granted without notice, particularly when Respondents will incur no damage
or liability by its issuance. Such writ is solely intended to get Respondents to act under the
Administrative Procedures Act as set forth below.
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cooor:

PETITION
1. Petitioner Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., is a securities broker-dealer
registered with the Securities Division, a sub-agency under the Department of Commerce,
State of Utah. Petitioner Marlen V. Johnson is registered with the Securities Division as a
securities agent.
2. Respondent Baldwin is the director of the Securities Division and is
responsible for the initiation and perpetuation of the existing administrative adjudicative
proceedings against Petitioners. The remaining individual Respondents are each and all
members of the Securities Advisory Board as set forth and established in §61-1-18.5, Utah
Code Ann. Such Respondents have been appointed by the Governor to oversee Respondent
Baldwin and the Securities Division. Petitioners believe that the Securities Advisory Board
has neither been made aware of the existing administrative proceedings nor of Petitioners'
Requests for Agency Review or Certification of Order as set forth below.
3. On April 27, 1989, Respondent Baldwin in his capacity as director of the
Securities Division of the Department of Commerce, State of Utah, filed administrative
adjudicative proceedings against Petitioners, alleging violations on Petitioners' part of
§61-1-6(1 )(g), Utah Code Ann. Such administrative adjudicative proceedings seek to revoke
or suspend the registrations of Respondents with the Division and are denominated by Case
Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG.
4. On July 3. 1989. Petitioners moved the Administrative Law Judge in said
administrative adjudicative proceedings for an Order dismissing such proceedings under
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that, based on §27 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities Division lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
and therefore such proceedings were and are unlawful.
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5. On August 29. 1989, the Administrative Law Judge in the
above-proceedings issued an Order denying Petitioners' Rule 12(b)(1) motion, erroneously
concluding that NASD rules do not have the force and effect of federal law, among other
assignments of error.
6. On September 11, 1989, Petitioners timely filed a Request for Agency Review
and Request for Hearing on such Order in accordance with §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. A
true and correct copy of such Request for Agency Review is attached hereto and
incorporated by reference as Exhibit "A". On September 11, 1989, Petitioners also filed an
alternative Request for Certification of the August 29, 1989 Order as a "Final Agency
Action", a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference
as Exhibit "B". Petitioners further filed on said date a Request for Disclosure of Appellate
Body Conflicts by and between them and the Securities Advisory Board, a true and correct
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C". On September 11, 1989, Petitioners also
filed a Brief in Support of their Request for Agency Review, a true and correct copy of which
is attached hereto as Exhibit "D". Subsequently, Petitioners further filed a Reply Brief to
their Request for Agency Review, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and
incorporated by reference Exhibit "E".
7. Since September 11, 1989, the date Petitioners filed their Requests for
Agency Review or for Certification, Petitioners have heard nothing from either Respondent
Baldwin or the Securities Advisory Board Member Respondents. Petitioners believe and
allege that Respondent Baldwin is deliberately or negligently stalling the disposition of
Petitioners' Request for Agency Review and that nothing will transpire in that regard in the
immediate future in the absence of the granting of this Extraordinary Writ. Petitioners
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further believe that Respondent Baldwin has failed to notify or properly inform the
Securities Advisory Board of Petitioners' formal Requests.
8. Petitioners have been substantially damaged in their property, business, and
reputations by the Division's initiation of the above-referenced administrative adjudicative
proceedings and because of the Respondents' unwillingness or failures to diligently act on
Petitioners' Requests for Agency Review or for Certification, Petitioners are continuing to
be substantially damaged in their business, property, and reputations. (See Affidavit of
Petitioners attached as Exhibit "C" to Exhibit "D" hereto.)
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
9. Under Rule 65(B)(b)(2), an extraordinary writ may be granted where an
inferior tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has abused its discretion. In
this case, Petitioners allege that Respondent Baldwin in particular has abused his discretion
on behalf of the Securities Division and the other Respondents in failing to act on
Petitioners' September 11, 1989, Requests for Agency Review or for Certification.
10. Under Rule 65(B)(b)(3), an extraordinary writ may also be granted where
the relief sought is to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right..
. to which he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully excluded by such inferior tribunal..
. board or person. In this case, the Respondents, by and through Respondent Baldwin, have
failed to act on Petitioners' Requests for either Agency Review or for Certification —
"rights1' to which they are entitled and from which they have been unlawfully excluded to
date under the Administrative Procedures Act.
WHEREFORE Petitioners pray for the granting of an Ex Parte Extraordinary Writ
directing the Respondents to either (1) grant their Request for Agency Review as
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contemplated in Exhibits "A" - "E" hereto or (2) otherwise certify the Administrative Law
Judge's Order of August 29. 1989. as a "final agency action" as contemplated in
§63-46b-14, Utah Code Ann. Because there is nothing to dispute with respect to the
foregoing Petition, because Respondents will not be damaged in the least by the issuance of
such a writ, and further, because Petitioners will continue to be damaged and prejudiced by
further delay and stalling on the part of Respondents acting through Baldwin, Petitioners
pray that their Petition be granted immediately and without notice as provided in Rule
65(B)(e). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In the event the Court does not grant this writ ex
parte and the Division resists this Petition at a forthcoming hearing. Petitioners pray for an
award of substantial Rule 11 and §78-27-56 sanctions against the Division.
DATED this 27th day of October. 1989/

PETITION.1-2
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:

REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.
CRD NO. 07678

Case No. SD-89-46BD

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON

Case No. SD-89-47AG

CRD NO. 2598888

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that in accordance with §63-46b-12. Utah Code Ann.,
and/or R151-46b-12(A) of the Rules of Procedure for Adjudicative Proceedings Before the
Department of Business Regulation. Respondents hereby request agency or superior agency
review of the Administrative Law Judge's Order dated August 29.1989, a true and correct
copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Respondents' Exhibit
"A". Respondents further request oral argument in accordance therewith. This Request is
timely filed in that Respondents' counsel did not receive the August 29. Order until August
31.1989.
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Respondents' grounds for requesting agency or superior agency review and
oral argument thereon include but are not limited to the following:
(1) the Court's August 29.1989. Order. Exhibit "A" hereto, is non-responsive to
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and erroneously treats Respondents'
motion as a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as argued at the hearing by the Division;
(2) the Order contains erroneous, superfluous, and irrelevant findings of fact
and conclusions of law relative to Respondents' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion and otherwise assumes
facts neither pleaded, admitted, nor in evidence and which otherwise improperly tend to go
to the merits of the Division's case;
(3) the Order erroneously compels the necessary legal conclusion that it would
have been possible for Respondents/as Utah residents, to have complied with their federal
NASD and SEC obligations, either themselves or by allowing -buy-ins" for their "own
account*, without violating the Division's unilateral and capricious interpretation of its own
March 1. Order;
(4) the Order is erroneous as a matter of law in concluding that the Division
has been delegated power and authority (i.e.. jurisdiction) to issue orders, unilaterally
interpret them, and thereby discipline an NASD member merely for obeying and complying
with superseding and pre-emptive federal securities law — "state action" further repugnant
to the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution in that Congress has
expressly delegated enforcement and interpretation of an NASD and SEC duty, liability, or
obligation to the federal courts under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
(5) the Order could not be more erroneous as a matter of law in concluding on
page 4 that "NASD rules . . . should not be accorded the force and effect of federal law . . .
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(6) the Order is erroneous in concluding that the Division's March 1.1989
Order — which says nothing of prohibiting "purchases" — quite literally supersedes and
overrides federal securities law specifically governed under the Exchange Act and over
which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction;
(7) the Order is erroneous as a matter of law Insofar as It concludes that the
Division, in light of §28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, can inconsistently regulate and
even discipline federal licensees contrary to express mandates of federal law, specifically,
that the Division can deem an act "unethical" when the preemptive federal regulatory
scheme declares the very same act "ethical";
(8) the Order is erroneous in concluding that the Division can give unlawful
extra-territorial effect to its Order of March 1 and otherwise give such Order a predatory
and discriminatory effect on Respondents; and
(9) the August 29, 1989 Order is erroneous in not concluding that the
Division's Amended Petitions are barred by pre-emption under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and otherwise repugnant to the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the
Constitution.
Respondents have the right to seek agency review of the August 29. Order and
otherwise exhaust their administrative remedies in that If the Division lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, which it does, these entire proceedings are unlawful and a waste of all parties'
time, energy, and money, particularly when such proceedings have already subjected and
continue to subject Respondents to substantial damages. Respondents further have a right
to seek agency review of the Order of August 29. because it is not a "non-final procedural
ruling" of the Division. Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. Atomic Energy Commission.
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433 F.2d 524. 526 (D.C.Cir. 1970). See also Ecee. inc. v. Federal Power Commission. 526
F.2d 1270.1273 (5th Cir.). cert, denied. 429 U.S. 866. 97 S.Ct. 176. 50 L.Ed.2d 147 (1976);
Coca-Cola Company v. Federal Trade Commission. 475 F.2d 299,302 (5th Cir.). cert.
denied. 414 U.S. 877. 94 S.Ct. 121. 38 LEd.2d 122 (1973).
Based on the foregoing and §63-46b-12(1)(b)(ii). Utah Code Ann.. Respondents
pray for immediate reversal of the August 29.1989 Order and for an Order declaring that
the Division has no jurisdiction to either unilaterally interpret its March 1. 1989 Order
inconsistently with federal securities law or otherwise bring a revocation proceeding
against an NASD member merely for obeying, complying, or attempting to comply with
superseding Exchange Act rules and regulations.
In accordance with applicable Department of Commerce rules. Respondents
herewith file a Brief in support of their grounds for review. The parties seeking review
further sign this Request as required under §63-46(b)- 12(b)(1), Utah Code Ann.
Respondents further hereby give notice that the Division shall have fifteen (15) days from
the date of its receipt hereof to file a responsive pleading if it so desires.
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MOTION TO DISMISS AND
ACCOMPANYING ORDER

In the Matter of the Registration of
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.
CRD No. 07678

Case No. SD-89-46BD

In the Matter of the Registration of
Marlen Vernon Johnson
CRD No. 2598888

Case No. SD-89-47AG

Appearances:
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents
Mark J. Griffin for the Division of Securities
By the Administrative Law Judge:
By Motion, dated July 3,1989, Respondents seek a dismissal of the instant adjudicative
proceedings. A memorandum in opposition thereto was filed by the Division on July 13, 1989. On the
just-stated date. Respondents also filed an affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss.
Oral argument on the pending motion was conducted on July 14,1989, at which time Respondents
filed a reply memorandum and copies of six (6) letters relative thereto.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. is a securities broker and Respondent Marlen
Vernon Johnson is a securities agent and principal of the just-named company. Respondents are duly
registered by the Division of Securities of the State of Utah.
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2. By Summary Order, dated March U1989. the DMrioadari&dtffetvdbMBtyortfl
transactional exemptions relative to the securities of UJS.A. Medical Corporation. The Summary Older has
been in effect on a continuous basis since the just-stated date.
3. Prior to entry of the March 1,1989 Summary Order, Respondent Johnson, as an agent and
principal for Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., had effected transactions in the securities of
U.S.A. Medical Corporation. Sparing detail, outstanding contracts existed between Respondent JohnsonBowles Company, Inc. and various third parties respecting the sale of the securities in question by
Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. to those third parties. Specifically, said contracts existed prior
to issuance of the March 1,1989 Summary Order.
4. Given the just-described contracts, and in order to effect the delivery of the securities in question
to various third parties. Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., through Respondent Marten Vernon
Johnson, purchased approximately 364,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation stock from seven (7)
individuals between April 3,1989 and April 13,1989. Respondents were aware of the March 1,1989
Summary Order when the just-described purchases were made.
5. On April 27,1989, the Division filed a Notice of Agency Action and Petition, wherein it was
alleged that Respondents had willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with the March 1,1989
Summary Order and that they had engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business.
Pursuant to an Amended Petition, dated July 19,1989, the Division has withdrawn the allegation that
Respondents had either willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with the March 1,1989 Summary
Order. However, based on the allegation that Respondents have engaged in dishonest or unethical practices
in the securities business, the Division seeks entry of an order suspending or revoking the respective
registration of Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. and Marlen Vemon Johnson.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents assert that the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction to initiate the instant
proceeding and to enter any disciplinary sanction as to their existing registration. Specifically, Respondents
contend that rules of conduct promulgated by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
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required that they complete their existing contracts by either payment or deli very of the securities In
question. Respondents further contend that compliance with that directive prompted their purchase of
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securitiesfromcertain Utah residents subsequent to the issuance of the March
1,1989 Summary Order and that said Order prohibited only the sale, but not the purchase, of the just-stated
securities. In essence. Respondents urge that the pertinent NASD rules of conduct promulgated pursuant to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 necessarily supercede the operation of the March 1,1989 Summary
Order and, thus, the instant proceeding should be dismissed.
During oral argument on the pending motion, counsel for Respondents extensively addressed those
rules of conduct which govern NASD members and whether Respondents could have been subject to
disciplinary sanction regarding their membership in that organization for any failure to comply with said
rules. In rejoinder, counsel for the Division has urged that Respondents could have fulfilled their
contractual obligations to third parties by means other than a purchase of U.S.A. Medical Corporation
securities, but that it was financially advantageous for Respondents to act as they did. The Division has
also asserted that Respondents solicited the sale of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities and that any such
solicitation is relevant to whether Respondents engaged in dishonest and unethical securities practices.
Notwithstanding the belabored arguments which were presented as to the foregoing matters, the
operative effect of the March 1,1989 Summary Order was to prevent the sale of unregistered securities to
Utah residents. Both parties concede that those securities had been the subject of market manipulation and
securities fraud. Under such circumstances, issuance of the Summary Order was clearly intended to preclude
any subsequent sale of those securities within this state.
With knowledge of the existence of the Summary Order, Respondents purchased said securities
from certain Utah residents. In so doing. Respondents' conduct effectively frustrated the attempts of the
Division to preclude the trading of those unregistered securities. Whether Respondents solicited the sale of
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities (and Respondents have strenuously urged that they did not), it is
obvious that their participation in those transactions as a purchaser of those securities facilitated a violation
of the Summary Order as to potentially subject them to disciplinary sanction in these proceedings.
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Respondents' assertion that NASD rules of conduct should be accorded the force and effect of federal
law, as to thus obviate compliance with the March 1,1989 Summary Order, is not well-founded.
Concededly, had Respondents owned the securities prior to March 1,1989 and merely delivered those
securities to third parties after the Summary Order had been issued, such a ministerial act may not have
exposed Respondents to possible revocation or suspension of their registration. However, Respondents'
purchase of the securities after March 1,1989 to effect their subsequent delivery of those securities to third
parties was squarely at odds with the operative effect of the March 1,1989 Summary Order. Simply put,
any necessary compliance by Respondents with NASD rules as a member of that self-regulatory
organization does not lend support to the conclusion that the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction in
this case.
Two further matters should be addressed. Both parties have noted certain aggravating and/or
mitigating factors in this case and have urged that such factors should be considered relative to the merits of
the pending motion. Without doubt, such circumstances are relevant as to any possible entry of a
disciplinary sanction at some subsequent stage in these proceedings. However, those factors are not
germane to the matter presently before the Court.
Respondents have also requested that any order denying the pending motion be certified as Tinal",
so that necessary review of that order can be sought. Section 63^46b-l2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as
amended, provides that parties to any adjudicative proceeding may seek review "of an order by the agency"
and sets forth the procedure to obtain any such review. R15l-46b- 12(A) is further applicable in that
respect. Presumably, Respondents' request that any order issued on the pending motion be certified as final
is one directed toward the provisions of Section 63-46b-14, which provides:
(1) Any party aggrieved may obtain judicial review affinal agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. (All
emphasis herein added).
It is not within the province of this Court to decided whether the order set forth below is TinaT, as to allow
for subsequent judicial review, nor to certify any such order as being final for purposes of such review.
However, the order herein is subject to agency review, as set forth above.
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ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondents' motion to dismiss the July 19,1989
Amended Petition is denied.
Dated this

Q / 7 *^

day of August, 1989.

JMS
Jt/Jteven Eklund
linistrative Law Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Accompanying .
Order, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to John Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111; to Craig F. McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th Floor, Kennecott
Building, 10 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84113, co-counsel for Respondents; and to
Mark J. Griffin, Assistant Attorney General for tfie Division of Securities at Tax & Business Regulation
Division, 130 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
Dated this

O?^/

day of August. 1989.

ooo
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Respondents

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR
AGENCY REVIEW

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.
CRD NO. 07678

Case No. SD-89-46BD

IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION
OF:
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON

Case No. SD-89-47AG

CRD NO. 2598888

Respondents, by and through their counsel, hereby submit this Reply Brief in
Support of their September 11,1989. Request for Agency Review of an August 29,1989,
Order and for a Hearing thereon.
COUNTERPOINT I
The discussion on pages 4 through 5 of the Division's Opposing Brief
(mischaracterized as a "Brief in Reply") is illogical. Therein, the Division fallaciously argues
that because the NASD is authorized under the Exchange Act to discipline a member for
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This makes no sense whatsoever, especially if one realizes that to engage in the business of
a securities broker-dealer and agent in these United States, one must, as a matter of law.
be a member of the NASD. (This is only true, however, if one is not simultaneously a member
of a national securities exchange which Respondents are not.) In other words, if one must
obey NASD rules to not only lawfully engage but lawfully remain in business, such person is
clearly required by jaw to obey such rules. The Division's argument on this point is
inexcusable nonsense, particularly when the NASD exists solely by virtue of the Exchange
Act and the SEC. Certainly NASD rules are not hollow and meaningless as the Division would
want us all to believe in these proceedings and there is no question that they have the
effect of federal law —the contrary 61 which was concluded in the August 29. 1989, Order
subject to this request for agency review. Lastly, if NASD rules meant nothing, why has the
Division itself specifically -patterned" its own R177-6-1 g after the very NASD rules in issue
in this case?
COUNTERPOINT II
On the last paragraph of page 4 of the Opposing Brief, the Division argues that
§28(a) and §27 of the Exchange Act do not exist as far as the Division is concerned and that
federal courts apparently do not have exclusive jurisdiction over that which is contemplated
in and governed under the Exchange Act. Nonetheless, whatever the "intention" of the
Division may be by way of its amended petitions, the fact remains that the instant
proceedings are in diametric conflict with Exchange Act mandates. For the sake of
interstate commerce and ensuring that the economy operates smoothly, the Exchange Act
requires completion of brokerage transactions and does not tolerate excuses in that
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regard. (The Exchange Act does, however, allow trades to be "broken" on mutual consent

of the parties but such is not at issue in these proceedings since those out-of-state
entities to whom Respondents owed stock refused or were contractually unable to "break"
the trades in issue.) Because the Division is apparently unable to comprehend this point and
Respondents cannot state it more clearly than they have, nothing more can be said in this
regard.
COUNTERPOINT III
Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 34-7920 is relevant to these proceedings
because it was issued to give people like Respondents guidance in their business. Contrary
to what the Division asserts, the Release does not say that "completion" of outstanding
federal obligations entered into prior to the date of a federal suspension order (not a state
order) excludes buying stock to ministerially complete such federal executory contracts.
[Emphasis added.] The Release also has no bearing on and says nothing of state
suspension orders. In fact, the Release does not contemplate any state orders of any kind.
Further, the Release clearly permits completion of federal contracts by "delivery" which is
exactly what Respondents did. The Division is hopelessly trying to read something into Rel.
No. 34-7920 which is simply not there. The Division has also cited no authority lending itself
to the Division's own self-serving interpretation of the Exchange Act Release. Because
such Release has the effect of federal law or rule, the Division's position is in further
diametric conflict with the Exchange Act.
COUNTERPOINT IV
In Argument A, page 7 of the Opposing Brief, the Division argues that
§63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann., and R151-46b-12, Department of Commerce Rules, only
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contemplate review of "final" orders of the Division. This position Is antithetical to the

express language of such statute and the concomitant rule which merely contemplate an
agency "order". The Division has S12 of the APA confused with S14 which requires a "final
agency action" prior to seeking "judicial review", not agency review. The Division's argument
on this point is thus a total misreading and misunderstanding of applicable law.
Agency review of the Order of August 29,1989. also does not cause any delay
in these proceedings as desperately argued by the Division. This is because the
Administrative Law Judge has ordered Respondents to file an answer, which they did on
October 4.1989. Further, because a reversal of the August 29, Order, would be entirely
dispositive of these proceedings, review of such Order would in fact expedite the just and
proper resolution of the amended petitions as contemplated in the APA. It is accordingly
undisputed that agency review is thus in everyone's best interests, including the Division's.
COUNTERPOINT V
The Division's Argument B on pages 7 and 8 of their Opposing Brief has no
merit for the reasons contained in the preceding Counterpoint. Further, a balancing test of
any kind is neither required nor necessary and to not review the Order of August 29, when it
may indeed be error, would substantially prejudice Respondents. Again, this is because a
reversal of such Order would immediately dispense with these entire proceedings and save
everyone, including the Utah taxpayer, a lot of time, energy, and expense.
COUNTERPOINT VI
With respect to Argument C in the Opposing Brief. Respondents acknowledge
that in oral argument on their Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss the words "non-delegation"
and ultra vires were not stated. This is because when a court engages in a pre-emption
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analysis, it is not necessary to get into a further analysis of the Supremacy and Commerce
Clauses. Schneiderwind v. ANR Pipeline Company. 108 S.Ct. 1145.485 U.S. 293 (March 22.
1988Hholding that a pre-emption question only involves an analysis of Congressional intent
and does not. at that point, require deciding Constitutional issues such as the Commerce
Clause). Respondents have asserted that the primary and most readily dispositive issue in
this case is pre-emption. For this reason. Respondents did not contemplate that this
specific issue would be either misunderstood or by-passed in the August 29.1989. ruling.
Regardless, because pre-emption was an issue and was apparently deemed by the
Administrative Law Judge to have no merit. Respondents believe and assert that it was
incumbent upon the Administrative Law Judge to then go the required step further and
apply Constitutional principles such as "non-delegation" and ultra vires. In other words.
Respondents should not be penalized in these proceedings merely because their counsel
lacked the foresight to anticipate how the Administrative Law Judge would rule on the
pre-emption issue. Based on the foregoing, such issues are relevant and they were
therefore indirectly before the Administrative Law Judge at the hearing, particularly when
the Administrative Law Judge undoubtedly knows far more about Constitutional law than
Respondents' counsel. Respondents thus contend that because these issues were not
addressed in the August 29. Order, it is thus reversible error.
The fact that the Division is so viciously fighting any just resolution of these
proceedings on the merits is disconcerting to say the least. For instance, why is it so
difficult for the Division to simply say: "If we are wrong, perhaps the amended petitions
ought to be dismissed and we should get on to something more noble?" Is such a position
really something so terrible? Surely, if there is merit to the "non-delegation" and ultra vires
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arguments posed by Respondents in their Supporting Brief, such arguments ought t o be

considered in the interests of justice. Simply put, how much of the taxpayers' money is
really justified in being spent prosecuting Respondents for something that harmed no one.
especially if these entire proceedings can be resolved quickly on agency review? One can
only conclude that because the Division is so irrationally concerned with Respondents*
raising of an issue which is dispositive of this case, these proceedings are obviously brought
in bad faith. As stated before, it is unfortunate that the Division's very last concern in these
proceedings is the doing of justice.
COUNTERPOINT VII
In Argument D. the Division claims that NASD rules do not have the force and
effect of law. If not. why has the Utah Court of Appeals in the Western Capital case held
that a Utah court has no jurisdiction to hear or interpret NASD rules? This argument is
particularly ironic in that the Division's own "dishonest and unethical practices" rule is
specifically and expressly "patterned" after the very NASD rule in issue in this case. Clearly,
the NASD was created to help the SEC administer the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
How then, can the NASD not only not be accorded the force and effect of federal law. but
any law at all? Is it really the Division's position that the NASD was not created in and under
the '34 Act and that Respondents are somehow miraculously making this all up?
The amended petitions are in conflict with federal law simply because
Respondents could not have complied with Judge Greene's ruling and NASD rules, on the
one hand, and the Division's unilateral interpretation of its own March Orders, on the other,
at the same time. If the Division does not see this as a conflict then there is simply nothing
more that can be said by anyone. Section 27 of the Exchange Act expressly provides that
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obligations, duties, and liabilities relative to trading securities In Interstate commerce must

be redressed in a U.S. District Court. The Division's amended petitions seek to create a
liability for Respondents' trading of securities in interstate commerce in conformity with
Exchange Act mandates and a federal judge's ruling. For this reason, it is impossible that
there could be no conflict. It is further impossible that the Division could have
subject-matter jurisdiction relative to these proceedings when the enforcement of
Exchange Act obligations, duties, and liabilities are the only issue in this case.
In Argument D the Division proceeds to argue that the thrust of the Division's
amended petitions impose no burden on interstate commerce. This statement ignores the
facts of this case. Had Respondents not honored their Exchange Act contracts, several
out-of-state NASD member broker-dealers and perhaps the largest clearing corporation in
the United States would have been severely damaged. At the same time, the Division does
not see this as having any impact on interstate commerce. If not. then what is it? The
Division would also have us all believe that Respondents should have allowed those
out-of-state entities to have bought Respondents "in." This argument ignores the fact that
such would have immediately put Respondents out of business and such would have even
more severely damaged each of those out-of-state entities who were owed U.S.A. Medical
stock. This is because Respondents could not have repaid such entities and each would
have forever been out-of-pocket whatever each would have had to expend to effect the
necessary "buy-ins".
The Division further argues that if the court engages in a balancing test "the
interest of the state in containing the further distribution of U.S.A. Medical stock"
outweighs Respondents' interest in complying with federal law. This statement ignores the
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enormous clearing corporation which also have an interest In seeing Respondents complete
their federal contracts. Further, this argument is astoundingty hypocritical and
preposterous in that if the Division were sincerely concerned about any U.S.A. Medical stock
not being distributed out of the state of Utah, it would not have given Susan Slattery and
P.B. Jameson a secret and private No-Action Letter which accomplishes the exact opposite
of this purported goal, namely, to encourage the unlawful distribution of U.S.A. Medical
stock out of the state of Utah at great benefit to the U.S.A. Medical Co-Conspirators. (A
true and correct copy of such No-Action Letter is attached hereto and incorporated by
reference as Exhibit "A". See also Respondents' Answer and Counterclaim on file herein
dated October 4. 1989. Affirmative Defense 8 therein.) To be sure, such No-Action Letter
clearly enables a Utah resident (more especially a U.S.A. Medical Co-Conspirator) to
contact an out-of-state "nominee" and ask him or her to place a so-called "unsolicited
order" with Susan Slattery and P.B. Jameson. If necessary, the Utah resident, to cover his
tracks, can mail or federal express the stock certificates to the out-of-state resident who
in turn can easily furnish them to the alleged selling broker — all as necessary to technically
comply with the August 9.1989 No-Action Letter. Further, the stock confirmation would be
routinely stamped "unsolicited" and so no one. including the Division, would be any the
"wiser". All of this, by the way. white the U.S.A. Medical Co-Conspirators are "touting" the
stock of U.S.A. Medical all over the United States and creating a market for their stock
which they can then sell via a Utah agent and a Utah broker-dealer (whom they control) at
substantial illegal profits to themselves. This is but a simple example of the effect of the
Division's ingenious No-Action Letter on which there are an infinite number of variations.

On th# othor hand. If the Division falls to eoe this as m complete undarmlnlng of Its March

Orders and as a natural consequence of its brilliant No-Action Letter and, if it otherwise
fails to see that such No-Action Letter enables and encourages a nationwide distribution of
the entire U.S.A. Medical "box" from the state Utah, the Division is surely naive to say the
least and has no business whatsoever regulating securities in this state or any other state.
On the other hand, if the Division's March Orders have the effect of deeming
U.S.A. Medical stock as "bad stock" which no Utah agent or broker should have anything to
do with, it is grossly inconsistent for the Division to say that a Utah agent such as Slattery
and a Utah broker-dealer such as P.B. Jameson can effect transactions in such stock they
clearly know to be "bad stock" and not be engaging in "dishonest and unethical practices"
— the very same allegation presently being leveled against Respondents. By the same
token, if the Division concedes that it has no jurisdiction over a U.S.A. Medical transaction
between an out-of-state broker and a Utah broker or agent — as clearly set forth in the
No-Action Letter — how can the Division simultaneously have jurisdiction over the instant
amended petitions and the conduct of Respondents in completing broker-to-broker
transactions entered into prior to March 1?
In sum. the Division argues that its amended petitions do not impose a burden
on interstate commerce merely because it doesn't think they do. The Division forgets the
other part of the Supreme Court's balancing test which requires a "local putative benefit"
that "outweighs" the burden on interstate commerce. Unfortunately for the Division, there
is no such "local putative benefit" resulting from the amended petitions and the Division has
shown none, and therefore, as a matter of law. the amended petitions impose a substantial
burden on interstate commerce in relation to local needs and objectives. Just ask one of

the out-of-state NASD members and Midwest Clearing if they would presently rather be

arbitrating and litigating against a bankrupt debtor whose assets have been thrown into the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation f SIPC"). The answer Is obvious.
CONCLUSION
In so adamantly resisting Respondents' Request for Agency Review, the
Division's attitude brings to mind the words of philosopher Herbert Spencer who said:
There is a principle which is a bar against all information, which
is proof against all arguments and which cannot fail to keep a
man in everlasting ignorance — that principle is contempt prior
to investigation.
Because all parties have something to gain by this Request for Agency Review, Respondents
urge that it be granted forthwith and that they get an opportunity to make their arguments
before the Securities Advisory Board as set forth in their pleadings on file herein. Surely the
Securities Advisory Board should know what is going on in this case and its input may well
shed valuable light on the issues presented. Finally, because Respondents also believe the
Order of August 29, 1989, improperly has the effect of a premature ruling on the merits of
this case, it must be reversed.
DATED this 6th day of October. 1989^

CERTIFICATPOF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 6th day of October, 1989. (s)he
hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN
SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW, including Exhibit MAH. to John C. Baldwin.
Director and Kathleen C. McGinley, Director of Broker-Dealer Section, Securities Division,
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Utah Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah
84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge and Presiding Officer J. Stephen Eklund. Esq..
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City. Utah
84145-0802; Mark J. Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General. 115 South State Capitol. Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114; and mailed the same, postage prepaid to Craig F. McCullough. Esq..
Callister. Duncan, & Nebeker, Co-Counsel to Respondents. 8th Floor, Kennecott BIdg.. 10
East South Temple Street. Salt Lake City. Utah 841
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 363©
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220

Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Telephone: (801)359-0833
Attorney for Petitioners

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC.. a
Utah corporation and MARLEN V.
JOHNSON.

EX PARTE ORDER GRANTING
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT AND
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT

Petitioners.

JOHN C. BALDWIN, Director.
Securities Division of the
Department of Commerce. State
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER,
KENT BURGON. DAVID HARDY.
MARGARET WICKENS. and KEITH
CANNON, members of the Securities
Advisory Board overseeing the
Securities Division,

CASE NO.

S%?Db'50k> ( V

JUDGE JAMES S. S A M

Respondents

The Petition for Extraordinary Writ in the above-matter seeking issuance of a
writ from this Court to be directed to Respondents to either grant Petitioners' Request for
Agency Review (and thereby review the same) or to otherwise certify the subject order on
review as a "final agency action" having come before this Court; the Court having reviewed
the Petition and having determined that a hearing is not necessary, and good cause further
appearing, the Court hereby orders as follows:
1. The Petition for Extraordinary Writ in the above-matter is hereby granted.

-1 -

C009^

ft. The Weepoodenf are hereby Immediately directed to undertake one of the
following courses of action:

(1)

Either grant Petitioners' Request for Agency Review as contemplated in
the Exhibits attached to the Petition and thereupon resolve all issues
presented therein, or

(2)

Certify the Administrative Law Judge's Order of August 29.1989. as a
"final agency action" as contemplated in §63-46b-14, Utah Code Ann.

day of October. 1989.
DATED this?/day

BY TH«/50URT

Jfufd District Court Judge
ORDER.1

" 2 -
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Third Judicial District

R. PAUL VAN DAM, #3312
Utah Attorney General
MARK J. GRIFFIN, #4329
Assistant Attorney General
115 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
(801) 538-1331

c

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC., a
Utah Corporation and MARLEN V.
JOHNSON,

UTAH

EX PARTE ORDER SETTING
ASIDE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT

Petitioners,
vs.
JOHN C. BALDWIN, Director,
Securities Division of the
Department of Commerce, State
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER,
KENT BURGON, DAVID HARDY,
MARGARET WICKENS, AND KEITH
CANNON, members of the
Securities Advisory Board
overseeing the Securities
Division,

Case No. 890906506 CV

Judge James S. Sawaya

Respondents.
The Court having reviewed the Ex Parte Petition to Set Aside
Ex Parte Order issued by this Court on October 27, 1989, and the
Court being satisfied in having heard the Respondent's arguments
in support of the Petition and being satisfied that there is just
cause appearing therefore, hereby

coioa

ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that this Court's Ex Parte
Order dated October 27, 1989, requiring the Respondents to
perform certain acts, is hereby set aside.

DATED this / ~ day of

J^^C>^^JAA^,

1989.

nn

R. PAUL VAN DAM, #3312
Utah Attorney General
MARK J. GRIFFIN, #4329
Assistant Attorney General
115 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
(801) 538-1331
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC., a
Utah Corporation and MARLEN V.
JOHNSON,

UTAH

EX PARTE PETITION TO
SET ASIDE EX PARTE ORDER

Petitioners,
vs.
JOHN C. BALDWIN, Director,
Securities Division of the
Department of Commerce, State
of Utah, and M. TRUMAN BOWLER,
KENT BURGON, DAVID HARDY,
MARGARET WICKENS, AND KEITH
CANNON, members of the
Securities Advisory Board
overseeing the Securities
Division,

Case No. 890906506 CV

Judge James S. Sawaya

Respondents.

The respondents by and through their attorney, Mark J.
Griffin, Assistant Attorney General, pursuant to Rule 7(b)(2) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby petition the above
court ex parte to set aside court's order dated October 27, 1989.
Rule 7(b)(2) provides in pertinent part that "any order

without

notice

the adverse

party

may be vacated

without

notice

by the judge who made it".

or

made

modified
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The respondents request that the court set aside its October
27th order based upon the following facts and arguments:
1.

On April 27, 1989 the Utah Securities Division, whose

director is respondent John C. Baldwin, initiated an
administrative adjudicative proceeding against the petitioners in
this matter, alleging violations of the statutory prohibition
against dishonest and unethical conduct in the petitioners'
capacity as licensees of the Division.

The aim of the ongoing

adjudicative proceeding is to determine whether or not to revoke
or suspend the registration of the petitioners.
2.

On August 29, 1989, following hearing and briefs, the

Administrative Law Judge denied petitioners' motion to dismiss
the administrative action, previously filed July 3, 1989. On
September 11, 1989 petitioners filed a request for agency review
and request for hearing of their request.

The petition was filed

with the Utah Securities Division, and John C. Baldwin acted as
presiding officer, designated by the Division to review
petitioners' request.
3.

On September 26, 1989 the Division filed a brief in

reply to petitioners' request for agency review and hearing,
which set forth the reasons underlying the Division's belief that
agency review in this matter, being discretionary with the
administrative forum, would not be appropriate because the order
of the Administrative Law Judge to deny petitioners' motion to
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dismiss was in the nature of an -interlocutory order"f not the
appropriate subject for review under S63-46b-13 of the
Administrative Procedures Act. A copy of the division's reply
brief was mailed to petitioners' counsel of September 26, 1989 at
his business address.
4.

On October 6, 1989 the petitioners' counsel filed a

reply brief with the Division in support of petitioners request
for agency review.

All told, 93 pages of pleadings and exhibits

were filed for Mr. Baldwin's review.

On October 30, 1989 John C.

Baldwin, as the presiding officer, issued the Division's order on
agency review, attached as Exhibit A.

The order, among other

things, denies the petitioners request for agency review.
5.

On October 30, 1989 the Division received the court's

ex parte order granting petitioners' extraordinary writ requiring
the respondents in this matter to elect between granting the
petitioners' request for agency review or certify the
Administrative Law Judge's order denying petitioners' motion to
dismiss as a "final agency action".
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION TO SET ASIDE
EX PARTE ORDER
POINT I
THE PETITIONERS HAVE SOUGHT TO DECEIVE THE COURT
Petitioners have attempted to hoodwink this Court into
believing that the Division was not responding to Petition's
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Request for Review.

The Petitioners have deliberately omitted to

state facts in their petition necessary to the Court's
determination as to whether the Court should issue this
extraordinary writ.

For example, the Petitioners have failed to

state to the Court that this matter was a matter of ongoing
pleading, i.e., that Petitioner's counsel had spoken to counsel
for the Respondents and such conversations were concerning the
ongoing pleading which was to take place pursuant to the
Petitioner's request for agency review.

Further, the Court is

not notified by Petitioners that the Respondents had filed on
September 26, 1989 a brief in reply to Petitioners' request for
agency review.

Petitioners neatly leave that document out of

their exhibit list so that the Court does not have an opportunity
to examine the true facts which were that this matter was a
matter of ongoing pleading.

Omission of that brief in reply

(Exhibit B) was calculated again to misinform the Court, by not
acquainting the Court with the substantial reasons contained
therein that indicate that the Petitioners' request for agency
review was wholly inappropriate.

Petitioners have hoped that by

denying the Court these facts, the Petitioners would be able to
secure ex parte relief which might somehow stampede the Division
into acting in a way which prudent judgment and timely review
would not consider.
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POINT II
THE PETITIONERS HAVE MO BASIS UNDER RULE
65B OR THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
SECTION 63-46b-l BT SBQ. TO PETITION FOR
AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT FROM THIS COURT,
Rule 65B(b) provides, in pertinent part, that:
(b) appropriate relief may be granted:

. ..

(2) where an inferior tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its
jurisdiction or abused its discretion; or
(3) the relief sought is to compel any inferior
tribunal, or any corporation, board or person to
perform an act which the law specially enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office/ trust, or
station; or to compel the admission of a party to
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which he is entitled and from which he is
unlawfully excluded by such inferior tribunal or
by such corporation, board or person; [emphasis
added]
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to base
their petition for an ex parte

writ upon facts which would

indicate to this Court that the Respondents, in exercising
judicial functions, have exceeded their jurisdiction or abused
their discretion.

Alternatively, Petitioners may support their

petition by demonstrating facts which indicate that the Court
needs to compel the Respondents to perform an act which the law
specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office.
The Petitioners know or have reason to know that they can
allege no facts in this regard that can support the issuance of
this ex parte order.
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Section 63-46b-12 (copy attached, Exhibit C) provides for

agency review of administrative orders.

In pertinent part, the

section states:
"If a statute or the agency's rules permit
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek
review of an order by the agency . . •, the
aggrieved party may file a written request for
review within thirty days . . ."
This section also contemplates the filing of responsive
pleadings, and allows the administrative forum to permit parties
to file briefs, to conduct oral argument, and to have hearings on
the matter*
The Department of Commerce of the State of Utah has also
promulgated a rule concerning agency review.

Rule R151-46b-12

of the Department (copy attached, Exhibit D) provides for the
filing of a request for agency review and also for the filing of
responsive pleadings.
None of the foregoing contemplates that the agency will be
reviewing orders which are "interlocutory" in nature, i.e.,
orders concerning the Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.

The rules

contemplate only the review of "final" agency orders.
Petitioners have wished, in this action, to take what is, in
essence, an interlocutory appeal to the agency itself when the
administrative law judge rules against them.

The procedure

contemplated by the Petitioners in their request for review is
erroneous and not in conformance with the commonly accepted
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notion that an administrative forum is more summary in nature
than are normal civil proceedings.
Additionally, there is absolutely nothing contained in the
Administrative Procedures Act, or in the Rules of the Department
of Commerce which would provide a basis for this Court issuing an
ex parte order requiring the Division to grant the Petitioner's
request for agency review.

Nor is there any portion of the

Administrative Procedures Act, or the Rules of the Department of
Business Regulation which provides a basis for this Court to
grant Petitioner's ex parte order requiring the Respondents to
certify the administrative law judge's interlocutory order as a
"final agency action."
The Petitioners simply are not entitled to take an appeal
from an interlocutory order of an administrative law judge.

This

is born out in the case of Sloan v. Board of Review, 118 Utah
Adv. Rep. 68 (October 2, 1989).

In Sloan, the Utah Court of

Appeals stated "an order of the agency is not final so long as it
reserves something to the agency for further decision".
68.

Ici at

In the Sloan case, the court dismissed an appeal due to the

lack of a final agency order.
Therefore, it has been the position of the Division, taken
in its Order on agency review issued October 30, 1989, that the
Petitioner's request for agency review was based on review of an
order which was interlocutory in nature, not a final agency
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action, and therefore was an inappropriate subject for agency
review.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The Respondents respectfully request that the Court set
aside its ex parte order, based on the fact that the Division has
issued its order on agency review which specifies that the
Petitioners had no basis for requesting review of the
administrative law judge's order.

Additionally, there appears no

statutory authority for this Court to order the Respondents to
grant the Petitioners' request for agency review or to certify as
"final" the administrative law judge's order dated August 29,
1989.
It is respectfully requested that the order be set aside ex
parte pursuant to Rule 7(b)(2) on the basis that Respondents had
no notice of the original ex parte proceeding before this Court
and petitioners will not be damaged in anyway if the order is set
aside.
DATED t h i s

/

^

day of

/vt&C€*~&~>

, 1989.

tIFFIN
A t t o r n e y General
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R. PAUL VAN DAM, #3312
Attorney General
Mark J. Griffin, #4329
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Petitioner
115 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF

IN THE MATTER OF THE

UTAH

:

BRIEF IN REPLY TO RESPONDENTS
REQUEST FOR AGENCY REVIEW AND
: HEARING.

REGISTRATION OF:
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC.
CRD NO. 07678

Case No. SD-89-46BD

IN THE MATTER OF THE
REGISTRATION OF*
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON
Case No. SD-89-47AG
CRD NO. 2598888

The Utah Securities Division, by and through its counsel,
Mark J. Griffin, hereby submits this Brief in Reply to Request
for Agency Review and Hearing thereon.

This brief is submitted

to the Division in compliance with Utah Code Ann. $63-46b-12(2).
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It is urged that the Division not undertake a review of the
Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order at this time for the reasons set forth out hereinafter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On March 1, 1989, the Division issued a Summary Order,

case number SD-89-030, denying the availability of all
transactional exemptions for the securities of

U.S.A. Medical

Corp., pursuant to the authority granted to the Division in
Section 61-1-14(3) of the Act. A copy of the Summary Order was
hand delivered to Johnson-Bowles on March 1, 1989.
2.

On March 1, 1989, the Division commenced an

administrative action to deny the availability of all
transactional exemptions from registration pursuant to Section
61-1-14(3) of the Act for the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corp.,
case number SD-89-031.

A copy of the Notice of Agency Action and

Petition was mailed to Johnson-Bowles on March 2, 1989.
3.

On March 27, 1989, the Division issued Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default Order denying the
availability of the transactional exemptions from registration
contained in Section 61-1-14(2) of the Act for the securities of
U.S.A. Medical Corp. and any affiliates who are successors. A
copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default
Order was mailed to Johnson-Bowles on March 27, 1989.
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4.

On March 31, 1989, the Division sent a letter to

Johnson-Bowles restating the Division's Summary Order and Default
Order.
5.

On or about April 3, 1989, through April 18, 1989,

respondent Johnson, acting in his capacity as an agent and
principal for Johnson-Bowles, attempted to affect or affected
transactions in the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corp., which
transactions are more accurately recorded at pages 4 and 5 of the
Division's initial Petition in this matter.

On April 27, 1989,

the Division filed the instant action against Johnson-Bowles
Company Inc. and Marlen Johnson requesting administration relief
against the registration of the respondents under authority of
Section 61-1-6(1)(b) and Section 61-1-6(1)(g).
6.

Upon

motion, dated July 3, 1989, a oral argument was

held on July 14, 1989 before the Administrative Law Judge in this
matter•
7.

On August 29, 1989, the Administrative Law Judge

entered an order denying the

motion to dismiss.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Pages 3 through 11 of the Respondents' brief purport to
contain statements of material fact.
are statements of law.

Many of these "statements"

Many also contain mixed questions of law

and fact and are argumentative in nature.

While it is the

contention of the Division that many of these "statements of
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material fact" might well be disputed, a complete reply to all of
the factual and legal and argumentative discrepancies is not the
intent nor the aim of this brief.

However, some of the points of

law contained in this same section are so erroneous as to merit
individual attention.

Por example, at page 3, paragraph 1 of the

statement of material facts, Respondents state "as members of the
NASD, Respondents are required by law to obey its rules and
regulations, including its rules of fair practice.
S78-o-3(b)(7)".
thing.

15 U.S.C.

However, 15 U.S.C. S78-o-3(b)(7) says no such

15 U.S.C. §78-o-3(b) indicates that an association of

brokers or dealers shall not be registered as a national
securities association unless the Commission determines that the
association meets the criteria listed in the section.

Subsection

3(b)(7), cited in Respondents' brief, is actually one of those
criteria and reads as follows.
"The rules of the association provide that...its
members and persons associated with its members
shall be appropriately disciplined for violation
of...the rules of the association...."
Therefore, the

statement that Respondents are required by

law to obey the rules and regulations of the NASD has no basis in
the section cited in the United States Code.

In fact, the

obligation to adhere to the rules and regulations of the
association is quite simply a function of the enforcement by the
NASD of its own rules and regulations.

The fact that the

Securities Exchange Act requires that the registered national
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association have rules which provide for the discipline of its
members, does not lead to the conclusion that Respondents are
required by law (i.e. the Securities Exchange Act) to obey the
rules and regulations of the NASD.

If there exists such a

portion of the Securities Exchange Act which stands for the
proposition espoused by the respondents it is certainly not found
in 15 U.S.C. S78o-3(b)(7).
At page 4, paragraph 2 counsel claims that it is -undisputed
that obligations under the NASD and SEC rules and regulations are
preempted under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 over which
Federal Courts have exclusive jurisdiction."
was Respondents
by state

courts

Assuming, that it

intent to indicate that it is the

interpretation

of the regulations of the NASD and the SEC which

are preempted under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
statement nevertheless is still useless to the determination of
the issues before the Division at this time.

It is clearly not

the intention of the Division to interpret or enforce the duties,
liabilities or obligations of the Respondents under the NASD or
SEC rules.

The Division has brought this action, based on an

allegation of dishonest and unethical conduct on the part of the
respondents concerning the purchases of shares of U.S.A. Medical
during the pendency of the Division's order which effectively
suspends the availability of secondary trading exemptions for
U.S.A. Medical stock.

0013*

Referring again to the errors in Respondents' "Statement of
Pacts" it is beyond belief that the Respondents continue to cite
to release number 34-7920 of the Securities Exchange Commission.
It is a continuing example of Respondents' refusal to
articulately address the legal and factual issues of this case.
As the Division forcefully pointed out at the hearing on the
Motion to Dismiss, release number 34-7920 has little to do with
the facts of this case.

First of all, the release is in the

nature of a "no-action", or "safe harbor" for those brokers who,
during a trading suspension, complete their agency or principal
contracts entered into prior to the suspension order.

A careful

reading of the release would yield the conclusion that the
release in no way covers the conduct of the Respondents, nor
provides a basis for the Respondents to argue that the release
entitles them to participate materially in the violation of Utah
law.

The release covers merely the completion

principal transactions.
payment or delivery."

of an agency or

The example given by the release is "by
It does not go so far as to say that

individuals may go out into the market place during the period of
the suspension and acquire securities from the market place or
from any source, for the purpose of effecting delivery in order
to cover short sales.
That concludes some observations concerning the most
erroneous sections contained in Respondents' "Statements of
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Facts."

Since we urge the Division not to review the Order at

this time, no effort is made here to point out the existence of
less troubling or obvious error•
ARGUMENT
A.

The Requested Review is of an Order Which is Not a

Final Agency Order, andf Therefore, the Request Should be Denied.
The Respondents' request is in the nature of an
interlocutory appeal.

The Administrative Procedures Act S63-46b-

1 et seq. is a relatively recent statute, and as such, there is
very little case law available for the interpretation of the
various provisions of the Act.

It is the position of the

Division that Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-12 and R151-46b-12, of the
rules of the Department of Commerce, contemplate only the review
of the final orders of the Division.

Review of interlocutory

matters would necessarily deprive the Administrative Law Forum of
its native simplicity and speed, interposing levels of delay that
were not contemplated by the framers of the Administrative
Procedures Act, nor by the rules of the Department of Commerce,
effectively interposing an interlocutory or secondary level of
appeal.

This level of complexity in an Administrative Forum, is

highly undesirable and as such provides an ample basis for the
denial of the Respondents' request.
B.

The Granting of a Request for Agency Review is a

Discretionary Function of the Agency, and Bax^ncing the Interest
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of the Party at this Stage of the Proceeding, the Division should
Deny the Reguest.
Utah Code Ann. $63-46b-12 and the corresponding rule of the
Department of Commerce make the granting of a request for review
a matter of discretion with the Division.

The consideration of a

grant of review would necessarily require a balancing of the
interest of the parties at this stage of the proceeding.

It is

the belief of the Division that the likelihood of the success of
the motion is considerably out weighed by the forum's interest in
proceeding expeditiously to the merits of the case.

Respondents

are not prejudiced because they may still raise the issue in
their memorandum on appeal of the Division's final order.
C.

The

Arguments Pertaining to the "Non-Delegation

Documents" and "Ultra Viresw Activity Were Not Raised in the
Previous Hearing nor Briefed in the

Memorandum Submitted

Pursuant to the Motions to Dismissf and Therefore, Ought Not to
be Reviewed at this Stage of the Proceeding.
It is the best recollection of counsel for the Division that
the matters raised by the respondents in their brief on pages 1119 concerning -Ultra Vires- activity by the Division and the
doctrine of -non-delegation- were not raised in the previous
hearing so that they could be addressed by the Administrative Law
Judge.

It is not in the best interest of the Forum to examine

piece meal the theories that the Respondents may conjure up after
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the fact.

Therefore, the interest of the forum would require

that the Division not review at this time new theories presented,
but since those matters alleged pertain to a jurisdictional
question these matters ought to be raised or combined with any
appeal that the Respondents may file of the Division's final
order.
Setting aside the issue of whether the Division should
exercise its discretion to review the interim order of the
Administrative Law Judge, based on these new theories propounded
by respondentsf and looking beyond at the merits of the arguments
raised in Respondents' brief pertaining to the "non-delegation
doctrine" and "Ultra Vires" activity by the Division, it is clear
that the arguments of the Respondents' are merely
misinterpretations of law.
D.

The Securities Division, in this action, is not seeking

to enforce any duty or liability under the Federal Securities
Exchange Act; therefore, no preemption issue arises.
Counsel can plainly read that the Division's Petition cites
two instances of dishonest and unethical conduct which are
sanctioned under §6 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act.
mentioned is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Nowhere

Similarly

Respondents have argued that this action is in conflict with the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Distilled to its finest
elements, Respondents' preemption argument is that this

coi?.«
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proceeding is in conflict with the Rules of Fair Practice of the
NASD, and, therefore, it is in conflict with the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The Respondents cite to no provision of
the Securities Exchange Act which endows the Rules of Fair
Practice of the NASD with the force of law. Assuming, for the
moment, that Respondents could demonstrate that such provision
existed, Respondents would also be required to demonstrate that
this action was in conflict with that law.

This they cannot do.

Respondents continually and disingenuously assert that
Respondents were put in the position of disobeying state law or
complying with the NASD rules of fair practice.

The Division has

repeatedly contended that such is not the case; that Respondents
were pursuing a course of conduct which would necessarily involve
a violation of state law on the part of another individual and
that the primary justification for Respondents engaging in the
conduct was monetary gain - not compliance with the NASD Rules of
Fair Practice.

Additionally, Respondents continually assert that

the Rule of Fair Practice with which they were bound to comply is
the rule regarding the honoring of outstanding contracts with
other broker-dealers.

The Division has repeatedly countered that

the principal reason for the transaction engaged in by the
Respondents was to remedy the firm's extensive problems with
regard to its net capital which were called into question by the
NASD when Respondents voluntarily engaged in short selling of

U.S.A. Medical securities.

Admittedly, the respondents have

extensively briefed the issue of whether or not this proceeding
is, in conflict with federal law and is therefore, preempted
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
The vigor with which the Respondents have undertaken to continue
to argue this point does not give credence to the Respondents'
argument.

The administrative law judge having had a complete

opportunity to hear the arguments of both sides and read the
briefs in connection therewith determined in the August 29th
Order that "any necessary compliance by respondents with NASD
rules is a member of that self-regulatory organization does not
lend support to the conclusion that the Division lacks subject
matter jurisdiction in this case."
There is no basis for the Respondents' position that the
rules of fair practice of the NASD supply a regulatory scheme of
such a nature and extent that state regulation with regard to
this proceeding is preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution.

Additionally, counsel for the

Division is familiar with the cases cited by Respondents in
support of their contention that the Division's action gives rise
to "dormant* commerce clause concerns.

Counsel has not

demonstrated in his brief, or in the hearing before the
Administrative Law Judge, that there is any burden imposed
interstate commerce as a result of this action.

11 -

If such a burden
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could be shown, that burden, under Edgar v, Mite Corp. 457 U.S.
624 (1981) and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970),
must be shown to outweigh the competing state interest in the
institution of these proceedings.

In reply to the "dormant"

commerce clause argument, the Division would simply state that
the interest of the state in containing the further distribution
of U.S.A. Medical stock, in light of Judge Green's order, would
significantly out weigh the Respondents' interest in complying
with the rules of any self-regulatory organization.

In the

determination of the "dormant" commerce clause issue, the finder
of fact would necessarily have to take into consideration the
true motivation of the Respondents in acting as they did.
Clearly, the financial motivation cannot be disregarded as the
chief motivator in the Respondents determination to participate
materially in violation of state law.

Of course, the finder of

fact may determine that compliance with the NASD regulations may
have caused the Respondents serious financial hardship.

However,

the Respondents, and this is in accordance with the findings of
Judge Green, were not altogether blameless for their financial
situation.

The Respondents cannot in good faith claim that the

instant proceedings impose a significant burden on the gigantic
and all encompassing interests of interstate commerce.

The

arguable impact of the instant proceedings is microscopic
compared to the impact in Edgar and Bruce Church.
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In Edgar, the
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U.S. Supreme Court grappled with the issue of whether a state's
tender offer statute could preclude a nationwide tender offer.
The court in Edgar was particularly concerned with the vast
discretion that lay in the hands of the Illinois Secretary of
State.

The statute would allow the Secretary to effectively

exercise that discretion to prohibit these vast tender offer
transactions in interstate commerce.
Pike v. Bruce Church dealt with the ability of a state to
require fruit packing facilities to be built in Arizona and
inhibited the interstate transportation of fruit which was not
packaged within the boundaries of the state.

Both those cases

held that the state's various interests paled by comparison to
the significant burdens the respective statutes imposed on
interstate commerce.

In this proceeding, however, the Division

is dealing with the dishonest and unethical conduct on the part
of two of its state licensees.

No evidence has been introduced

at hearing or in Respondents' memorandum and supporting documents
to lead a finder of fact to reasonably conclude that there is any
sizeable burden on interstate commerce threatened by the
Division's action in this proceeding.
CONCLUSION
Though there may have been a considerable financial burden
upon the Respondents by the operation of the NASD Rules of Fair
Practice and the net capital requirements of both state and
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federal agencies, the risk of those financial burdens were
voluntarily undertaken by the respondents when they engaged in
short sales of the U.S.A. Medical Stock. Additionally, those
financial burdens do not justify knowing and material
participation in a violation of State law.

It simply cannot be

said that the effects of this proceeding reach beyond the
Respondents into the vast arena of interstate commerce raising
constitutional commerce clause issues. Nor have the Respondents
shown a conflict with federal laws or regulatory schemes
sufficient to provide a basis for preemption of this proceeding.
It is urged that the Division rely upon the opinion of the
Administrative Law Judge with respect to these issues and deny
Respondents' request for review of these issues at this time,
noting that the Respondents may raise these very same issues in
any appeal of the Division's Final Order in this matter.
Finally, the Respondents' Request for a Hearing in this
matter will likely result in significant delay of this proceeding
and, particularly in light of the insubstantial arguments
supporting the Request for Review, such a hearing is not
warranted on the issues presented.
DATED this

day of September, 1989.

MARK J. GRIFFIN
Assistant Attorney General
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and therefore unenforceable. The enforcement or
performance of any and all such open trades or
contracts would constitute and serve to complete
illegal trades and unenforceable contracts. This
would violate securities laws."
Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson sent the just-stated letter to
prompt the initiation of an NASD arbitration proceeding with
respect to the dispute concerning the buy-in of U.S.A. Medical
Corporation securities by Otra Clearing, Inc.
9.

On March 29, 1989, the Division's March 1, 1989 Summary

Order was made permanent by default.

Respondents received copies

of the Division's March 1, 1989 and March 29, 1989 Orders on or
about the date of their respective issuance.
10.

As of March 1, 1989, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company,

Inc. owed

several

Corporation

hundred

thousand

securities to several

corporations.

shares of

U.S.A. Medical

broker-dealers

and clearing

Sometime after the just-stated date, Respondents

purchased a total of 397,900 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation
securities from six

(6) Utah residents and one

(1) New York

resident. The Utah residents and the amount of shares so purchased
were: Paul Jones

(180,900), Nick Julian

(69,500), Leo Pavich

(67,500), Jim Coleman (30,000), Philip Tanzani (20,000) and Richard
Sax (18,000). The New York resident was Sheldon Flateman (12,000).
Respondents purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities as the
means to satisfy outstanding contracts for the delivery of those
securities to several broker-dealers and clearing corporations.
11.

Prior

to

Respondents'

purchase

of

U.S.A.

Medical

Corporation securities from the above-named seven individuals,
- 5 -

Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson informed Mr. Julian, Mr. Pavich,
Mr. Coleman, Mr. Tanzani and Mr. Sax of the February 28, 1989
ruling which had been entered by the Court in the previouslyreferenced security fraud action and the March 1, 1989 and March
29, 1989 Orders entered by the Division.

Mr. Flateman and Mr.

Jones, who were both registered NASD representatives, were also
aware of the Federal Court ruling and the Division's Orders. Prior
to March 1, 1989, Mr. Jones, a licensed securities agent with
Wasatch Stock Trading, was involved with the trading of U.S.A.
Medical Corporation securities.
12.

During April 1989, Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson was

informed by a Karl Smith that a John Dawson had U.S.A. Medical
Corporation securities which Mr. Smith believed Mr. Dawson was
desirous of selling.
Vernon Johnson

Based on that information, Respondent Marlen

contacted

Mr. Dawson

interested in selling those securities.

to determine

if he was

No sale resulted and the

conversation between Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson and Mr.
Dawson did not constitute a violation of the Division's March 1989
Order.

Further, there is no sufficient evidence to find that

Respondents or their agents solicited any of the above-named seven
(7)

individuals

to

sell

their

U.S.A.

Medical

Corporation

securities.
13.

Given the price which Respondents sold U.S.A. Medical

Corporation securities prior to entry of the March 1, 1989 Order
and the subsequent price which Respondents paid the above-named
seven (7) individuals to purchase said securities after March 1,
- 6 -

1989, Respondents realized a profit totalling $6,538 in that regard
to thus deliver those securities to satisfy existing contracts with
various broker-dealers and clearing corporations.
14.

On March 20, 1990, Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson

purchased 54,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities
from Mr. Sax.

During the instant proceeding, Respondent testified

that he purchased those securities for an entity known as the
January Corporation as the means to possibly satisfy a pending NASD
arbitration proceeding between Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company,
Inc. and Otra Clearing, Inc. regarding the March 1, 1989 buy-in of
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities by Otra Clearing, Inc.

On

March 29, 1990 Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson - through the
January Corporation - sold the 54,000 shares to a firm known as
Sorenson, Chiddo & May.
15.

Sometime within the last two

(2) months, Respondent

Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. filed a Form BDW with the Division to
request that its1 broker-dealer registration be withdrawn.

Said

request was denied, given the pending disciplinary proceeding as to
that registration.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents contend they did not engage in any dishonest or
unethical conduct and that no disciplinary sanction should enter
with regard to their registration as a securities broker-dealer and
agent, respectively.

Specifically, Respondents assert that: (1)

the Division's March 1, 1989 Order prevented only the sale of
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities; (2) Respondents purchased
- 7 -

those securities to satisfy existing contracts to thus deliver the
securities to various broker-dealers and clearing corporations; and
(3) Section 61-1-6(1)(g), Utah Code Ann. 1953 (as amended), quoted
below, may not be applied to interfere with Respondents' attempts
to honor their contractual obligations to such third parties.
Respondents urge that the Division has taken no action against
other individuals who may have participated in the purchase or sale
of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities after entry of the March
1, 1989 Order. Respondents also contend that the imposition of any
sanction in this proceeding would be inconsistent with their duty
to have complied with NASD requirements which prompted

their

purchase of the securities in order to avoid entry of a possible
sanction with regard to their NASD affiliation.
Section 61-1-6(1) provides as follows:
"Upon approval by a majority of the Securities
Advisory Board, the director...may
issue an
order. . .suspending,
or
revoking
any
registration,... if the director finds that it is in
the public interest and if he finds...with respect
to the. . .registrant or, in the case of a brokerdealer..., any partner, officer, or director or any
person occupying a similar status or performing
similar functions, or any person directly or
indirectly controlling the broker-dealer..., that
such person:
(g)
engaged
in
dishonest
or
unethical
practices
in
the
securities business..."
To be further noted is Section 61-1-7, which provides:
"It is unlawful for any person to offer or
sell any security in this state unless it is
registered under this chapter or the security or
transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14."
The proper scope and operative effect of the March 1, 1989 Order
- 8 -

entered by the Division was to prohibit any trading of U.S.A.
Medical Corporation securities within this state.

Since those

securities were neither registered nor exempt from registration and
had been traded in a fraudulent scheme designed to manipulate the
price of those securities, the just-stated order was duly entered
to protect the public interest.

It is specious to argue, as

Respondents assert, that the order only prohibited the sale of
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities. Given the unlawful issuance
of those securities and that the subsequent trading of those
securities was tainted by fraudulent and manipulative practices,
the proper scope of the March 1, 1989 Order must be broadly
interpreted and in a manner consistent with the purpose for the
issuance of that order.
Concededly, Respondents had an existing contractual obligation
to deliver U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities to various brokerdealers and clearing corporations prior to the entry of the March
1, 1989 Order.

It is obvious that Respondents elected to trade in

the securities at issue in an effort to mitigate their "short"
position, avoid potentially severe economic consequences and escape
the entry of a possible sanction on their NASD membership.

Under

the circumstances, no other alternative existed to thus foster
Respondents' economic

interests and

the motivation

for their

conduct is clearly understandable.
Nevertheless, Respondents purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation
securities after March 1, 1989 with knowledge that a sale of those
securities would constitute a violation of the March 1, 1989 Order.
- 9 -

Such

conduct

clearly

constitutes

a

"dishonest

or

unethical

practice" within the meaning of Section 61-1-6(1)(g) and provides
a sufficient basis upon which to enter a disciplinary sanction as
to Respondents' registration.
Regardless of the factors which prompted Respondents purchase
of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities, that conduct frustrated
the Division's appropriate efforts to preclude trading in those
securities and thus partially emasculated the effect of the March
1, 1989 Order. While the record does not identify when Respondents
purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities after March 1,
1989, any delay between entry of the March 1, 1989 Order and
Respondents' subsequent purchase of the securities appears to be
more reflective of the common knowledge that the price of those
securities would decrease after entry of the March l, 1989 Order
rather than any intended compliance by Respondents with that order.
Respondents' contention that the Division has engaged in
selective enforcement of the March 1, 1989 Order lacks serious
merit.

The Board notes that a disciplinary proceeding has been

initiated as to Mr. Jones.

It is unknown whether any disciplinary

proceeding may be subsequently initiated as to Otra Clearing, Inc.,
P.B. Jameson, R.A. Johnson or any of their agents with regard to
the buy-in notice issued to Respondents by Otra Clearing, Inc. In
any event, the fact remains that Respondents engaged in misconduct
which subjects them to entry of a disciplinary sanction regardless
of whether other proceedings are initiated by the Division as to
other entities or individuals.
- 10 -

Given the circumstances of this case, it may well have been
impossible for Respondents to have either satisfied their existing
contractual obligations to various broker-dealers and clearing
corporations and avoid the subsequent entry of a disciplinary
sanction in the proceeding or to have scrupulously avoided trading
in U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities and escape possible action
on their NASD membership.

However, the existence of that dilemma

does not support Respondents1 assertions that their duty to comply
with the March 1, 1989 Order was inferior and subordinate to their
satisfaction of any NASD requirements and that no disciplinary
sanction can enter in this forum because they could have been
potentially subject to adverse NASD action if they did not satisfy
their contractual obligations to third parties.
Concededly, there is no evidence that Respondents1 violation
of the March 1, 1989 Order resulted in any harm to the investing
public.

Nevertheless, entry of a disciplinary sanction in this

proceeding is in the public interest and clearly warranted due to
Respondents1 non-compliance with the March 1, 1989 Order which was
duly entered to regulate the trading of U.S.A. Medical Corporation
securities.

The record reflects that Respondents' dishonest and

unethical conduct was driven by a desire to realize monetary gain
and/or avoid financial loss and that Respondents' willingness to
engage in trading the securities shifted over time, depending upon
whatever would promote Respondents' economic interests. Adherence
to orders duly entered by the Division which govern the practices
of broker-dealers and agents engaged in the securities business
- 11 -

should not be a matter dictated by the potential for monetary gain.
By reason of the serious nature of Respondents' misconduct, an
appropriately severe sanction should be entered.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the registration of Respondent
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. as a broker-dealer in the State of
Utah and the registration of Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson as an
agent in this state shall be suspended for one (1) year.
It is further ordered that said suspensions shall be deemed
retroactively effective from the date that Respondent JohnsonBowles Company, Inc. filed its1 Form BD.W with the Division of
Securities.
It is further ordered that, upon expiration of the period of
suspension set forth above, Respondents1 registration shall be
placed on probation for two (2) years.

Should Respondents fail to

comply with the statutes and rules which govern their registration
during that time, further proceedings shall be conducted and a
determination made whether a sanction of greater severity than that
set forth herein is warranted.
Dated this

ICAM

day of August, 1990.
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Keith Canno
Kent
rrgar4t Wicke

BY THE DIRECTOR:
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
are hereby approved. Said Order shall become effective thirty (30)
days from the date set forth below.
Dated this

day of August, 1990.

^John C. Baldwin
Director
Administrative Review of this Order may be obtained by filing
a Request for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of
this Order.
Any request for a review shall comply with the
requirements set forth in Sections 61-1-23, 63-46b-12(l) and the
departmental rules which govern agency review.
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of
this Order. Any petition for such Review shall comply with the
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-16.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have this day hand-delivered the
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order properly
addressed to: Mark J. Griffin, Assistant Attorney General for the
Division of Securities at Tax & Business Regulation Division, 130
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; Kathleen C. McGinley,
Director, Broker/Dealer Section, Division of Securities, Department
of Commerce; Steven J. Eklund, Administrative Law Judge, Department
of Commerce; John Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and mailed postage prepaid to: Craig F.
McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th Floor, Kennecott
Building, 10 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84113, cocounsel for Respondents.
Dated this /3C^

day of August, 1990^
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